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The Lithuanian-Polish Dispute and the Great Powers, 1918-1923
In the wake of World War I, Europe was a political nightmare. Although the
Armistice of 1918 effectively ended the Great War, peace in Eastern Europe was far from
assured. The sudden, unexpected end of the war, combined with the growing threat of
communist revolution throughout Europe created an unsettling atmosphere during the
interwar period. The Great Powers-the victorious Allied forces of France, Great Britain,
Italy, and the United States-met at Paris to reconstruct Europe. In particular, the Great
Powers had numerous territorial questions to resolve. One of the most fascinating
territorial struggles concerned the city of Vilnius (Vilna in Russian, Wilno in Polish),
located at the confluence of the Neris (Russian Viliya) and Vilnia rivers. Possession of
the city of Vilnius, the ancient and current capital of Lithuania, and its surrounding region
sparked an intense conflict between Poland and Lithuania.
On Feb. 16, 1918, the Lithuanian National Council (Taryba), which had been
formed in 1917, proclaimed Lithuania's independence and set up a national government.
Although formal German recognition was secured in March, real independence was not
achieved until the German collapse in the west in November. At that time, Lithuania's
frontiers had not been clearly established, and unresolved border questions characterized
Lithuania's foreign relations throughout the interwar period. As the Germans began to
withdraw after the armistice of November 11, 1918, the newly independent Lithuanian
government was faced with an invasion by the Soviets from the east. On January 5, 1919,
the Red Army occupied Vilnius and a communist Lithuanian government was installed.
The national government was evacuated to the city of Kaunas. The national government,
protected by German forces that remained in western Lithuania on instructions from the
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Great Powers, succeeded in organizing an army, which began to push the Soviets out of
the country.
The problem of Vilnius and its surrounding region bedeviled Polish-Lithuanian
relations. Modem Lithuanian nationalism was based on a fusion of ethnicity and historic
identity. Vilnius, the capital of the historic state, was a multiethnic city with a heavily
Polish cultural veneer. Many in Poland, while not averse to Lithuania's claim, felt that
Lithuania itself had historically become a part of a wider Polish cultural realm and sought
to resurrect some form of the common political entity that had existed until 1795. For
many Poles, Lithuania had become a part of their country. Others considered that, if the
Lithuanians were to set up an independent state based on the principle of ethnic
population, Vilnius-with its large Polish population-should become a part of Poland.
One strong supporter of Vilnius' incorporation into Poland was the Polish head of state,
Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, who stemmed from a Polonized Lithuanian noble family. On
April 20, 1919, the Polish army took Vilnius from the Red Army and prevented the
Lithuanians from reoccupying the city. The Lithuanians rejected the demands for union
with Poland, and hostilities were avoided only by the Great Powers' creation of a
demarcation line (the Foch Line) to separate the armies of the two countries. According
to the Foch Line, Vilnius was left in Polish hands.
In the June 1920 the Red Army reoccupied Vilnius while pushing the Poles back
to Warsaw. On July 12 1920, Soviet Russia ceded the city to Lithuania. Subsequently,
violence broke out between Lithuania and Poland. The League of Nations arranged a
partial armistice (Oct. 7, 1920) that put Vilnius under Lithuanian control and called for
negotiations to settle all remaining border disputes between the two countries. Two days
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later the Polish general Lucjan Zeligowski drove the Lithuanian troops out, proclaimed
the independence of central Lithuania, and established its government at Vilnius. For the
next year and a half, negotiations continued under the aegis of the League of Nations,
which finally abandoned its role as mediator on Jan. 13, 1922.
Five days earlier, however, General Zeligowski, again prompted by Pilsudski,
called for elections for a regional Diet, which on February 20, 1922 voted to incorporate
central Lithuania into Poland. Subsequently, Poland unilaterally incorporated the city and
its surrounding region. That arrangement was later accepted by the League's council,
which set the border almost along the Foch Line (Feb. 3, 1923)-a decision that was
confirmed on March 15 by the conference of ambassadors of the Allied Powers.
Lithuania, however, rejected the settlement and, on the basis of the continuing Vilnius
dispute, refused to arrange regular diplomatic relations with Poland. Only in 1938, under
the pressure of a Polish ultimatum (issued March 17), did Lithuania agree to receive a
Polish representative. Vilnius was restored to Lithuania on Oct. 10, 1939. The PolishLithuanian conflict over Vilnius prevented the formation of an effective bloc of eastern
European countries between Germany and the Soviet Union.
The Vilnius question was a more important issue to Lithuanian historiography
than to Polish historiography. As a result, there is a heavier concentration of Lithuanian
sources and scholarship on the subject. Along with heavy Lithuanian scholarship, also
comes a heavy Lithuanian bias. The essays by Alfonsas Eidintas 1 and Vytautas Zalys2,
both Lithuanian, are the most complete and objective studies of Lithuanian history
1

Alfonsas Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," and "The Nation Creates Its State" in Lithuania in
European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918-1940, ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1997).
2
Zalys, "The Return of Lithuania To The European Stage," Ibid.
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available, especially concerning Lithuania during the interwar period. Under Soviet rule,
the work of Lithuanian historians at home had to pass through a severe filtering and
molding process that limited what they could say. Lithuanian scholars in the Soviet
Union were only permitted to study Lithuania in the narrow and contrived confines of the
"Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic." As a result, distortions of scholarship occurred.
Furthermore, emigre and foreign historians did not have the documentary materials to
produce quality analytical work. The works by Eidintas and Zalys established the new
benchmark for Lithuanian historiography. Equally valuable are the monographs written
by the American scholar, Alfred Erich Senn, whose father lived in interwar Lithuania.
Senn's scholarship of modem Lithuanian history is well researched and he presents his
arguments in a clear and unbiased manner.
Early History

The Lithuanian people lived in relative obscurity along the Baltic coast for
centuries, attracting little attention from other European countries. As one of Europe's
last pagan outposts, Lithuania came under heavy attack from the hostile Teutonic knights
in the thirteenth century. Abandoning its loose communal system for a monarchical form
of government, Lithuania became aggressive and powerful, spreading its conquests
throughout Eastern Europe, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. In the early
fourteenth century the Grand Duke Gediminas founded the city of Vilnius (Vilna in
Russian, Wilno in Polish) to serve as the royal capital. Establishing their nation as one of
the wealthiest and most powerful in Europe, the Grand Dukes of Lithuania ruled an
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enormous territory in which only approximately one-tenth of the people were Lithuanian
of origin. 3
Union with Poland

The roots of the Vilnius question are found in the evolution of Polish-Lithuanian
relations since the fourteenth century. In 1386 Janiello (Jogaila), the Grand Duke of
Lithuania, married Jadwiga, young Queen of Poland. The dynastic union of the
Lithuanian and Polish thrones resulted in the Christianization of the Lithuanian people in
the Roman Catholic rite and the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility. Initially, the
political union between Poland and Lithuania was an artificial creation, aimed at
4
checking the German advance into the Baltic. The union of Lithuania and Poland

remained a loose alliance by virtue of a common ruler until the Lublin General Union Act
of 1569.
On July 1, 1569, a common Polish-Lithuanian parliament meeting in Lublin
transformed the loose personal union of the two states into a Commonwealth of Two
Peoples. The Lublin General Union Act of 1569 federated the Lithuanian-Polish union
5
into a single Commonwealth. (See Map 1.) According to its provisions, Lithuania was to

retain its own territory, separate government officials and administrative apparatus, its
own standing army, legal systems and laws, treasury, and schools. In common with
Poland were to be the sovereign, elected jointly and crowned in Cracow, the Sejm and the
Senate, and the two countries' foreign policies.
3

W.J. Brockelbank, "The Vilna Dispute," American Journal ofInternational Law 20 (July 1926),

483.
4

James A. Michener, Poland (New York: Ballantine Books, 1983), 61.
Kazimieras Grauzinis, "Lithuania's Conflict with Poland over the Territories of Vilnius and
Suvalkai," in Eastern Lithuania: A Collection of Historical and Ethnographical Studies, ed. Algirdas M.
Budreckis, trans. the Lithuanian Association of the Vilnius Region (Chicago: Lithuanian Association of the
Vilnius Region, 1985), 476.
5
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Over time the two peoples became unified into one. Within the two countries,
Polish language and culture came to dominate. The Lithuanian language, which loosely
resembled Sanskrit, was hard to understand and seldom used in writing. In contrast, the
Polish language was a Slavic tongue more easily understood by the surrounding nations
and was more conducive for printing. Little by little, the Polish language came to be the
language used in government, academia, and religion. Educated Lithuanians were forced
to use Polish as the language of culture. As a result, the Lithuanian language slowly
became relegated to the unwritten jargon of an oppressed peasantry who knew little of the
world beyond their village. 6 This point is illustrated by the examples of Tadeusz
Kosciuszko, the Polish national hero, and Adam Mickiewicz, the great Polish poet, who
were both born in Lithuania, but were assimilated into Polish culture. Poland's cultural
assimilation of Lithuania was gradual and actually increased the harmony among the two
peoples. 7 The harmony was further supported by a common religion, Roman Catholicism.
Religion was such an integral part of the lives of both peoples that it was common for
peasants to confuse their nationality with their religion. When asked their nationality,
peasants would often reply "Catholic."8 Four centuries of a common political life and a
common religion generated a community of common interests among the Poles and
Lithuanians.
Russian Rule

During the 18th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth declined as a
political power. Attempts at reform triggered foreign intervention from Prussia, Austria-

6

Alfred Erich Senn, "Introduction," in Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First
Republic, 1918-1940, 3.
7
Brockelbank, 484.
8
Ibid.
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Hungary, and Russia. Following three partitions, the old state ceased to exist. During the
first two partitions, in 1772 and 1793, Lithuania lost only lands inhabited by East Slavs.
The third partition inl 795 resulted in a division of the land inhabited by ethnic
Lithuanians. The bulk of it went to Russia. Upon acquiring this territory, Russia
designated the four provinces of Vilnius, Kaunas, Grodno, and Sulwalki as "the
Lithuanian Provinces." (See Map 2.) Despite Russian political control of Lithuania,
"Polonization" continued through the school system and the Catholic Church. After both
Poles and Lithuanians launched unsuccessful revolts in 1830-1831 and 1863 against
Russian rule, the imperial Russian government tried to free the Lithuanian people from
9
the perceived dangerous and seditious influence of the Polish intelligentsia. The passive

Polonization of Lithuania was now replaced with a policy of active "Russification." This
policy of eliminating the "Lithuanian identity" was especially harsh in Vilnius, where
Governor-General Nikolai Muraviev administered it. Vilnius University, the only
institution of higher learning in Lithuania, was closed; use of Russian language in schools
and government was mandated; and Russian law replaced the Statute of Lithuania, the
code oflaw for Lithuania's nobles that had been in force since 1529.
It was during this time period that that first substantial statistics on the ethnic
composition of the Lithuania were compiled. These numbers were taken from parish
censuses conducted during the 1850s. The first person to make use of such parochial
statistics and apply them to the Vilnius province was Mikhail Lebedkin, who published
10
the census figures for Lithuania in 1862. His findings are presented in Table 1:

9

Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 12.
Mikhail Ledkin, Vestnik lugozapadnoi Rosii, (Kiev, 1862) in Algirdas M. Budreckis,
"Demographic Problems of Vilnius Province," in Eastern Lithuania: A Collection ofHistorical and
Ethnographical Studies, 297.
10
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Table 1: Ethnic Composition of the Vilnius Province in 1862 (according to Lebedkin)
Lithuanians
Poles
Belarussians
Ukrainians
Great Russians
Krivichi
Jews
Germans
Tartars

418,880
154,386
146,432
701
14,950
23,016
76,802
902
2 416

49.98%
18.42%
17.42%
0.08%
1.79%
2.75%
9.16%
0.11%
0.29%

Total:

838,485

100.00%

According to Lebedkin's census, Lithuanians were over twice as numerous as the Poles
in the Vilnius region. Unfortunately, Lebedkin-more accurately, the sources he
utilized-did not explain the criteria for designating each ethnic group, which casts doubt
upon the findings. One can only assume that the decisive factor was language. 11
Lebedkin, himself, was a Great Russian, and there is no basis for thinking that he had any
pro-Lithuanian tendencies.
Roderik D'Erkert, a member of the Imperial Geographic Society of Russia,
published an atlas in 1863 attempting to explain the expansion of the Polish nation. 12 He
relied upon figures from the 1858 census obtained by the Russian Statistical Committee
and from information gathered by clergymen. His findings are presented in Table 2:
Table 2: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province in 1863 (according to D'Erkert)
Poles
Russians
Germans
Lithuanians
Jews
Others
Total Inhabitants

212,000
178,000
900
386,000
77,000
2,800
856,700

24.75%
20.78%
00.11%
45.06%
08.99%
00.33%

Ibid., 299.
Robert D'Erkert, Atlas Ethnographique de provinces habitees en totalite ou en partie par des
polonais (St. Petersburg, 1863), in Budreckis, 300.
II
12

9
It is important to note that D'Erkert considered Belarussians and Ukrainians as Poles.

According to his statistics, Lithuanians comprised 44.8% of the inhabitants of Vilnius.
D'Erkert was himself a Polonized German, thus his figures for Lithuanians are likely to
be minimized in favor of Poles. In comparing the ethnographic maps of Lebedkin and
D'Erkert, both have approximately the same number and similar percentages. Moreover,
they both agree that the Vilnius province had a Lithuanian majority and that the region
was mainly a Lithuanian-speaking area. Since Polish Catholic priests and Russian
Orthodox clergymen gathered the data that each scholar used, there is no evidence of the
authors or the sources having pro-Lithuanian tendencies.
In 1887, the Polish ethnographer Edward Czynski published a comprehensive
study on the Poles and the Polish ethnographic area. 13 A Polish nationalist, the purpose of
Czynski's work was to delineate Poland's ethnographic boundaries and to determine the
members of the Polish nation. Czynski does not include the Vilnius region in Poland's
ethnographic boundaries, rather, he considers Suvalki the easternmost "Polish town." His
results are shown in Table 3:
Table 3: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province in 1887 (according to Czynski)
Lithuanians
Poles
Jews
Belarussians
Others
Total

417,200
281,312
176,416
239,592
77 480

35.0%
23.6%
14.8%
20.1 %
6.5%

1,192,000

100.0%

He found that 44 percent of the population of the city of Vilnius was Polish in 1880. This
number is unreliably high because he labeled all Roman Catholics as Poles. Despite this

13

Edward Czynski, Ethnograficzno-statystyczny zarys liczebnosci I rozsiedlenia ludnosci polskiej
(Wisla, 1887), in Budreckis, 304.
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bias, however, he did point out that Lithuanians constituted the plurality in the Vilnius
province.
In 1897 the Russian Tsar conducted the First General Census of the Russian
Empire. 14 This census tabulated the results not only by province, but by county as well.
(See Map 3.) This census was more-or-less-scientific, using native tongue as the basis for
nationality. The results of that census, indicating ethnic differentiation of the Vilnius
province are shown in Table 4:
Table 4: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province (according to Russian Census 1897)
Lithuanians

Poles

Orthodox

Old Believers

Belarussian

76,916
Vilnius
133
Vileika
699
Dysna
17,700
Lyda
8,757
Asmena
Svencionys 57,869
118,161
Trakai

25,293
4,492
4,562
8,298
3,556
9,080
21,990

7,524
118,972
106,118
50,025
70,304
16,522
8,198

3,670
524
9,161
44
510
7,472
2,010

82,527
60,138
59,074
100,319
116,561
65,484
29,179

Total

77,274

377,663

23,391

513,282

276,226

Jews
15,377
16,962
13,088
19,522
24,373 '
9,128
18,664
117,124

Others
1,474
607
702
436
2,284
760
1,959
8,240

Serious doubts have been raised as to the objectivity of this report. Local Russian
officials, who enthusiastically sought to show the central authorities that under their
administration the "Russification" of the "Northwest Territory" was progressing,
conducted the census. 15 The census takers sought to list as many Russians and
Belarussians as possible.
The Tsarist government undertook a second census at the beginning of the
16
twentieth century. This was the Police Statistical Inquiry of 1909. The results of this

inquiry are given in Table 5:

14

Pervaja vseobscaja perepis naselinenija Rossijskoj imperij, 1897 (St. Petersburg, 1904), in
Budreckis, 306.
15
Budreckis, 312.
16
Pervaja vseobscaja perepis naselinenija Rossijskoj imperij, in Budreckis, 307.
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Table 5: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province (according to Russian Census 1909)
Lithuanians
16,283
Vilnius
66
Vileika
1,036
Dysna
4,238
Lyda
12,154
Asmena
Svencionys 73,336
124,735
Trakai

Total

231,828

Poles

Orthodox

107,887
7,311
6,057 105,448
3,838 121,602
48,812
12,461
3,538
72,325
19,386
3,698
51,452
8,024
188,931

382,908

Old Believers

Belarussian

Jews

Others

3,758
696
12,735
390
5,260
3,070

55,623
69,119
85,091
127,282
136,279
74,587
22,370

38,392
15,484
16,500
18,528
21,557
10,256
25,349

8
248
365
518
951
389
1,615

25,909

570,351

146,066

4,064

Differences are noticeable between the 1897 and the 1909 tables. In just over twelve
years, the overall population increased, but the number of Lithuanians decreased by about
forty-five thousand. The number of Poles, however, more than doubled although there is
no record of any mass migration of Poles to the Vilnius region at this time. 17 Why? Did
the Poles "Polonize" so many other people?
Two major explanations can account for these numbers. First, the 1909
questionnaire was issued without specific instructions. As a result, the data was collected
haphazardly without any uniformity from district to district. 18 Secondly, political
motivations existed for falsification. During the 1909 census, the police in many localities
relied upon documents gathered by the Polish clergy. The pastors attempted to list all
Catholics as Poles, not only to show their numerical ascendancy in order to gain more
influence in the area, but also because of religious motives. 19 Therefore, where
intentionally or not, the pastors listed the people as Poles in order to protect Catholic
locales from the encroachment by the Russian Orthodoxy. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the majority of non-Polish Catholics in many locales were listed as Poles.

17

Budreckis, 310.
lbid., 308.
19
lbid., 311.
18

12

After centuries of gradual erosion of the Lithuanian language by the Poles and
formal edicts outlawing Lithuanian by the Russians, Lithuanians began to value and
develop their tongue. 20 In 1883 the modem national movement began in Lithuania with
the underground publication of the Auszra (The Dawn), the first Lithuanian newspaper in
the Russian Empire. Other publications soon appeared, including books and magazines
published by Lithuanians in America. The goals of this movement were to educate all
illiterate Lithuanians to read and write in Lithuanian, increase appreciation of Lithuanian
literature, and to organize the masses against future exploitation. 21 The revival of
Lithuanian culture and literature was met with stiff resistance. The clergy, mostly Polish,
utilized its authority to persuade many Lithuanians, especially in the southeast, to use
Polish as their religious and vernacular language. These efforts by the Catholic Church
further blurred the line between language and national origin.

22

By the late nineteenth century, the Lithuanian national movement was enlarging
the scope of its efforts. Building upon the revival of the Lithuanian language, the
movement was soon advocating the restoration of Lithuania as a separate country. At the
heart of the movement was a nostalgia to rekindle the glorious history of the medieval
Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 23 Attempting to establish a clear connection with the past,
activists made their headquarters in Vilnius, the ancient capital of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania. A gathering of the region's leading professors, students, and civil servants
formed the so-called Twelve Apostles' circle of Lithuanian intellectuals in 1895. The
initial goal of this group was to restore a distinctly Lithuanian identity for the town. From

20

Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 12.
Brockelbank, 484.
22
Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 13.
23
Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 14.
21
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this point onward, Vilnius would become the center for most Lithuanian nationalist
activities and the heart of the Lithuanian nationalist movement.
With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1905, active russification of the
Lithuanians came to an end. The harsh restrictions imposed upon the Lithuanian language
and press were revoked. During this period of relaxation by the Russians the Lithuanian
national movement gained momentum. In November 1905, for the first time in modem
Lithuanian history, representatives from all social groups met in Vilnius to shape the
national movement. The Vilnius Diet, later referred to as the "Great Vilnius Assembly"
of 1905, met to discuss grievances and formulate formal demands to present to the Tsar.
The convention of over 2,000 delegates quickly went beyond its initial purpose and called
for a restoration of an autonomous Lithuanian state within ethnic Lithuanian boundaries
(the areas of Vilnius, Kaunas, Grodno and Suwalki), which would be governed by a
democratically elected parliament in Vilnius. 24 The resolutions of the Vilnius Diet were
of extreme importance as they outlined the constitutional and international aims of
Lithuanian nationalism and broadly defined the political evolution that Lithuania would
follow along the path to statehood. 25 The Russian Tsar formally denounced these
resolutions.
In 1907 the Russians reformed the process by which the Duma elected its

representatives. Lithuanians, in a voting block with Jewish voters, managed to elect
several representatives. All of Lithuania's electoral victories came in the provinces of
Kaunas and Sulwalki, and that they failed to win any seats in Vilnius. 26 As members of

24

Alfred Erich Senn, The Emergence ofModern Lithuania (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1959), 10.
25
Eidintas, "Restoration of the State," 18.
26
Ibid.
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the Duma, Lithuanian representatives worked tirelessly for Lithuanian national interests,
pleading for autonomy. These efforts, however, were of little importance to the Russians
with the prospect of World War looming on the horizon.
World War I

Although not a willing participant in World War I, Lithuania was hit hard by the
Great War. (See Map 4.) The German army mobilized thousands of Lithuanians living in
East Prussia (Lithuania Minor). Over half a million Lithuanians fought for the Allied
cause in Russian, British, and American units (over the course of the war, 11, 700
27
Lithuanians died fighting in the Russian Army alone. ) Situated on the strategic Russian-

German border, the Russian army hastily mobilized Lithuania for war. The Russian army
not only confiscated horses and food from the Lithuanian peasants, but also deported
those peoples considered unreliable, or sympathetic to the German cause, especially
Jews, away from the Lithuanian front deep into Russia. On August 17, 1914, Russian
General Pavel Rennenkampf led an offensive into East Prussia. The unexpectedly quick
defeat of General Alksander Samsonov forced the Russians into a disorganized retreat.
To hinder German advancement into Russia, Lithuanian peasants were ordered to bum
their farms, abandon their crops, and head east into Russia. Approximately 500,000
28
inhabitants were evacuated to the interior of Russia. The German forces poured into

Lithuania, laying siege to and capturing the fortress of Kaunas in the spring of 1915 and
occupying Vilnius on September 19, 1915. Upon entering Vilnius, the German
commander Alexei Pfeil called Vilnius the "the prettiest pearl of the Polish kingdom." To

27
28

Eidintas, "Restoration of the State,"18.
Budreckis, 314.
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29
the new conquerors, Vilnius appeared to be a Polish city. Its architecture was western

European, showing Gothic, Baroque and classical influences. Poles controlled the city's
previous local administration and religious services in the city's many Roman Catholic
Churches were held in Polish. Lithuania was now under German military occupation. In
1915 the German army created Ober Ost (Oberbefehlshaber Ost) to utilize Lithuania's
resources to benefit the German army.
The simultaneous movement of large groups of peoples across Lithuania's
30
borders altered Lithuania's ethnic composition immeasurably. The mobilization efforts

by the Russian Army, the removal of Lithuanian Jews, and the retreat of ethnic
Lithuanians into Russia all shaped Lithuania's ethnic composition. Shortly after the
Germans occupied the country, a special committee under Captain von Beckerath was
ordered to determine the actual proportions of the various nationalities in Vilnius, in both
the city and the province. On March 3, 1916, he reported that both Vilnius and Grodno
provinces showed a large majority of Poles and Jews, against a small percentage of
Lithuanians. His statistics are shown in Table 6: 31
Table 6: Ethnic Composition of Vilnius Province in 1916 (according to von Beckerath)
Poles
Jews
Lithuanians
Belarussians
Russians-Others

70.0%
23.9%
3.5%
2.6%

How can we account for such a complete ethnic transformation in less than 10 years? The
vast majority of German military police who aided von Beckerath to "interpret"
29

Roman Debicki, Foreign Policy ofPoland, 1919-39, with a foreword by Oscar Halecki (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 14.
30
Alfred Erich Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question (Leiden, Netherlands:
E. J. Brill, 1966), 7.
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nationality were Poles from Silesia. 32 Furthermore, in 1916 the German imperialists were
considering the idea of a "Polish Kingdom" in order· to win over the Poles to their
military efforts. The Vilnius region or "Russland [Russia] Poland" would have been an
important addition to such a Polish kingdom. 33
During this period of reorganization, the Germans merged the Vilnius District and
Lithuanian District (Kaunas) into "Militarverwaltung Litauen" in June 1916. As well as
conscripting war resources from the Lithuanian population, the army also employed an
active policy of "Germanization." The German military administration put a restriction
on movement, mandated that German be used in all schools (closing those that did not
comply), and closed all Lithuanian language newspapers except for the Dabartis (The
Present), which was reduced to printing solely pro-German propaganda.

34

Independence

The war also had a tremendous effect upon the Lithuanian national movement.
Initially, Lithuania actively supported the Russian war effort. In the Russian Duma,
Martynas Ycas, a deputy from Kaunas, pledged Lithuanian support in the defense of
Russia against the attacking German army. In August 1914 Lithuanian leaders in Vilnius
organized a Lithuanian Center, under the leadership of Antanas Smetona, with
representatives from all the Lithuanian political groups except the Social Democrats.
Once Vilnius fell to the Germans, contact with Y cas and other prominent Lithuanians in
Russia was cut of£ A third center for Lithuanian nationalism was located in Lausanne,
Switzerland, where Juozas Gabrys directed the "Lithuanian Information Bureau." Gabrys,
31

Centralne Biuro Statystyczne, Rocznik statstyczny Wilna, 1921-28 (Vilnius, 1930), in Budreckis,

32

Budreckis, 315.
Ibid.

314.
33

17
a Lithuanian emigre, had dealings with United States intelligence officers in Switzerland
as well as the French Deuxieme Bureau. In 1916, a conference of Lithuanians met at
35
Bern and demanded "absolute autonomy." Smetona, Ycas and Gabrys were all

Lithuanian nationalists and were in close contact with one another. Their different
environments, however, affected their respective views of Lithuania's future.

36

Rallying around the leadership of Antanas Smetona, the Lithuanian Center sought
cooperation with the Germans. Having occupied Lithuania, the German government
intended to annex it by either of two ways: Direct annexation, colonization, and
Germanization of Lithuania; or the creation of a formally independent state that would be
37
completely dependent on Germany. This issue polarized the Kaiser William II, the chief

military authorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Reichstag centrists. The
issue became further charged as the Lithuanians insisted upon independence for the
historically ethnic Lithuanian lands of Vilnius, Kaunas, Suwalki, and Grodno. In August
1917, the occupation administration granted permission to the Lithuanians to hold a
conference, in cooperation with the German authorities, to discuss the future of
Lithuania. The Vilnius Conference was held on September 18-22, 1917, with 222
participants representing all of the major political parties and social groups. These were
among the most active people in Lithuanian politics at this time. From the outset, the
delegates displayed strong anti-German attitudes and firm determination for an
independent Lithuania. The Conference elected a twenty-member council, the Council of
Lithuania (Lietuvos Taryba), to act as the executive authority of the Lithuanian people.
34
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The Taryba, in turn, chose Antanas Smetana as its chairman. In the following months,
conferences of Lithuanians in Stockholm, Bern, Russia and the United States officially
recognized the Taryba as representing the will of the Lithuanian people.

38

In December 1917 a Lithuanian delegation was permitted to travel to Berlin to
discuss the fate of Lithuanian. The Germans offered Lithuania autonomy from Russia,
but Lithuania would then be required to enter into a particular type of federation with
Germany, bound by conventions on military affairs, transportation, customs union and
finance. Using a text prepared by the Germans, the Taryba tentatively approved the
document with some minor changes on December 11, 1917. The resolution proclaimed
the restoration of the independent state of Lithuania with Vilnius as the capital.
Furthermore, Lithuania requested the protection and aid of the German Reich. and the
Taryba declared itself to be "in favor of the Lithuanian State's firm and perpetual bond of
alliance with Germany."39
Upon its publication, Lithuanians were outraged with the agreement. While they
applauded the severing of Lithuania's ties to Russia, they viewed the "permanent and
40
firm alliance" with Germany as a retreat from the decisions of the Vilnius Conference.

Frustrated that Germany had yet to recognize the Declaration of December 11, the Taryba
reconvened on February 16, 1918, and approved a new resolution. 41 This second
declaration of independence made no mention of ties to any foreign country. It boldly
proclaimed Lithuania an independent, democratic state with its capital in Vilnius. All
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existing political ties to foreign nations were abolished (including Germany, as well as
Russia) and if future political ties with foreign powers were to be established, a
democratically elected Constituent Assembly must first approve the terms. February 16
was soon hailed as the national holiday of Lithuanian Independence. Angered by
Lithuania's second declaration, Kaiser William II refused to recognize it. Rather, on
March 23, 1918, he officially recognized Lithuania on the principles of the original
declaration of independence from December 11, which emphasized close ties to
Germany. 42
Rumors began to circulate of a German plan to incorporate Lithuania into a union
with Saxony or Prussia. Fearing such an action, on July 13, 1918, the conservative wing
of the Taryba, in an attempt to maintain Lithuania's independence, proposed the revival
of a monarchy. They extended an invitation to Duke Wilhelm von Urach, Count of
Wurtemberg, to rule as King of Lithuania. 43 Urach, who was notoriously favorable to
Lithuanian independence, accepted the throne and adopted the name Mindaugas II. Since
this invitation was not agreed upon by a democratically elected Constituent Assembly, as
was stipulated in the February 16 declaration, a newly elected Taryba condemned this
move as illegal and annulled it on November 2, 1918. 44
Post World War I

The Armistice of 1918 brought no peace to Eastern Europe, as war would
continue into 1920. Allied victory, the German revolution and the Bolshevik advance all
followed with lightning rapidity. Lithuania was a country in crisis. In an attempt to
42
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establish stability, the Taryba invited Augustinas Voldemaras to become Prime Minister
on November 5, 1918.45 A brilliant scholar, Voldemaras had been Docent of History from
the University of St. Petersburg. Unfortunately, his tendency to antagonize people, along
with his egoism and his quick temper, handicapped his political career. Voldemaras
inherited an economically devastated country that lacked any fixed boundaries, and was
plagued by rogue bands of demoralized German military units that pillaged the
countryside. Since the government had no system of local administration, was unable to
collect taxes, or even organize an effective police force, it lacked real power to alleviate
46
any of the country's problems. Furthermore, any efforts to address these problems were

constantly being challenged by local Poles who were actively trying to form a Lithuanian
union with Poland. While the Lithuanian government was trying to bring stability to the
domestic situation, hostile neighbors forced Lithuania to fight a continuous series of wars
to maintain its independence.
On November 13, 1918, the Soviet Russian government annulled the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, by which it had surrendered any claims to Lithuania, and the Red Army
began to push west. 47 Joseph Stalin, Commissar of Nationalities of the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), envisioned Lithuania as part of the Soviet
union. To reassert Russian control in the region, he ordered Lithuanian Bolsheviks to
form a communist government and proclaim Lithuania a Soviet Socialist Republic.
Vincas Kapsukas and Zigmas Aleksa-Angarietis proceeded to Lithuania to oversee the
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process. On December 8, 1918, the self-proclaimed provisional Lithuanian Revolutionary
Government, headed by Kapsukas, was established. And on December 16, 1918, the
48
The
Soviet (Bolshevik) regime in Lithuania was officially proclaimed by manifesto.

plan was for the Lithuanian Soviet government to then greet the Red Army as its own and
not an occupational force. With the Bolsheviks in place, the Red Army invaded
Lithuania.
Grasping the urgency of the situation, the first task of the Voldemaras government
was to organize an effective defense against the Bolshevik advance. On November 23,
1918, the government ordered the creation of a Lithuanian army, mobilizing Lithuanian
49
soldiers returning from Russia. Lithuanian peoples throughout the countryside rallied to

defend their homeland. Approximately 12,000 Lithuanian volunteers would enlist in the
army between 1918 and 1920, of which approximately 1,444 soldiers, militiamen, and
guerillas would die. 50 As volunteers gathered in Bolshevik-free parts of the country, the
biggest problem was equipping the army. To overcome this lack of arms, the Lithuanian
government was able to purchase limited amounts of supplies from the German army. On
December 20, with the Bolshevik Army nearing the outskirts of Vilnius, Smetona and
Voldemaras departed to Germany to seek financial assistance. The leadership of
Lithuania and its defenses fell to Mykolas Slezevicius, who encouraged all Lithuanians to
resist the invading Soviet units. With the Red Army drawing ever closer, the Lithuanian
Government was obliged to withdraw to Kaunas, from where the defense of the country
against the Bolsheviks was directed. Russian units subsequently occupied Vilnius on
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January 5, 1919. The Lithuanians were able to work with several German units that
remained in western Lithuania on instructions from the Great Powers, who were
concerned about a possible Bolshevik advance into East Prussia, to halt their retreat line
at Kaunas. This allowed Lithuania to reorganize their military units. Meanwhile, the Red
Army overran most of eastern Lithuania, penetrating as deep into Lithuania as Siauliai in
the north, but was eventually stopped by German troops stationed in Latvia. (Map 5.)
Having occupied Vilnius, the Red Army installed a communist Lithuanian
government and renamed the region the Lithuanian-Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic
in February 1919. 51 This move proved extremely unpopular among the Lithuanian
populace for several reasons. The Bolsheviks declared a progressive policy of designating
five official languages: Lithuanian, Polish, Belarussian, Yiddish, and Russian. Since few
people spoke all of these languages, only Russian was used. This indirect attempt at
"Russification" angered most Lithuanians and quashed any support for the Bolshevik
cause. 52 Furthermore, the Red Army was very poorly supplied and was forced to live off
the land. They conscripted food, clothing and livestock, which the Lithuanians viewed as
robbery. These harsh policies of the Russian invading Army drove many peasants to
enlist in the Lithuanian army.
The Russian Red Army, fighting on foreign soil, did not prove to be as spirited as
the Lithuanian army, which was fighting to defend its homeland. Despite early setbacks,
the Lithuanian army received a boost in March when Colonel Warwick Greene and
53
fourteen United States army officers visited Lithuania. Colonel Greene brought much
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needed military and medical supplies along with him. Furthermore, many Lithuanians
considered this visit as the possible beginning of diplomatic relations with the Great
Powers. The visits of Colonel Constantin Reboul, who led joint French and British
troops, and of unofficial diplomat Herbert Grant Watson to Kaunas, also raised spirits
and helped the Lithuanian army reorganize. 54 By April 1919, nearly 6,000 armed
Lithuanian soldiers began to repulse the seemingly invincible Red Army, pushing it all
the way back to Vilnius. 55 On the eve of the recapture of Vilnius from the Bolsheviks, the
national army of Lithuanian was forestalled by the Polish army, which was advancing
from the southeast and occupied the city. The Poles justified their move into Lithuania
not just as an anti-Bolshevik action, but also on the basis of self-determination of local
Poles. Thus, by April 19, 1919, Vilnius was under Polish control. The Lithuanian
government wishing to avoid an armed conflict with Poland addressed itself to the Allied
Powers with a protest against this Polish action. Despite this setback, the Lithuanian
Army continued to pursue the Russians and by late August 1919, the Red Army was
expelled from its last Lithuanian holding, the city of Zarasai. Realizing their rapidly
diminishing position, on September 11, 1919, the government of the Russian S.F.S.R
offered to negotiate for peace with Lithuania. These talks would not open until early
1920. More good news came on September 26, 1919, when Great Britain awarded de
facto recognition to Lithuania.
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While Lithuania viewed the Bolshevik Red Army as the primary threat to its
independence, there was still the problem of German troops in the area. German troops
were slow to withdraw from Lithuania, as the Armistice of November 1918 obligated
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German troops to remain on the territory of the former Russian Empire, until further
Allied instruction. 57 As Germany's Western Front collapsed, this problem was further
complicated as volunteers from Germany joined Russian refugees to form new military
units in the struggle against Bolshevik Russia. General Rudiger von der Goltz was given
command of all German units in the area. During the summer of 1919, a splinter group of
Goltz's forces, led by Pavel Bermondt-Avalov, moved south into Lithuania from Latvia.
Lithuanians viewed Bermondt's efforts as a German attempt to maintain a foothold in the
Baltic. While the Lithuanian national army was already facing the Bolsheviks and the
Poles on numerous fronts in the south, Bermondt overran the Siauliai region in the north.
When Lithuania received assurances that Poland would not attack its rear in October
1919, they proceeded to move its Army north and directly engaged Bermondt. The Allied
powers had expressed similar concerns that the German forces were no longer fighting
58
Bolsheviks and had demanded a swift German withdrawal. An allied military mission,

headed by a Frenchman, General Henri Albert Niessel, supervised the evacuation of the
59
Bennondtists from Northern Lithuania. Fighting alongside Allied forces, Lithuania

reclaimed the city of Radviliskis on November 21-22 1919, which forced a rapid
evacuation of Bermondtist units. By mid-December the last Bermondtist troops, pursued
by Lithuanian forces, evacuated Lithuanian territory.
As difficult as it was for Lithuania to defend its independence on the battlefield, it
was equally difficult for it to defend its independence in the eyes of the world. At the
Paris Peace Conference, the Lithuanian delegation, led by Augustinas Voldemaras, was
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denied its request for official status. This setback did not change Lithuanian goals for the
Conference; it still demanded international diplomatic recognition, a clear demarcation of
its frontiers, and assistance in rebuilding their war-ravaged economy. 60 Of particular
urgency were their frontiers, as Lithuania's territorial aspirations directly collided with
German and Polish interests. The Lithuanian delegation first had to determine on exactly
what foundations-historical or ethnological-the restoration of Lithuania would be
accomplished. They soon rejected the historical concept of Lithuania, that is, the
grandiose concept of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and opted for the principle of a
national state, that is, a state founded on a union of ethnologic areas. Unfortunately, this
concept of ethnologic Lithuania was rather nebulous. Since Lithuania does not have any
natural national frontiers, such as mountains, rivers, swamps, or deserts, it is difficult to
establish ethnic boundaries. Generally speaking, ethnologic Lithuania had to encompass
the former Russian provinces of Vilnius, Kaunas, Suwalki, and Grodno. Furthermore, but
less fervently, the Lithuania delegation hoped to annex Lithuania Minor (northern East
Prussia) and reunite that region's large Lithuanian population with Lithuania proper,
which angered Germany. Also, both Lithuania and Poland claimed the city of Vilnius and
the surrounding region. On March 24, 1919, Voldemaras formally demanded recognition
of an ethnologic Lithuania, based on the above territories, as well as parts of the province
of Courland, totaling 125,000 square kilometers of territory and a population of
approximately six million. 61 (Map 6.)
Although the Great Powers denied Voldemaras' demand and never specifically
mentioned a "Lithuanian state, "the Versailles treaty did contain several articles that

60
61

Zalys, 65.
Ibid.

26
directly affected Lithuanian territory.

62

In Article 433, the provisional government of

Lithuania was considered an already "existing" but not yet an "established" government.
Article 87 postponed the demarcation of Poland's eastern frontiers. Articles 28 and 99
both provided for the detachment of territory of Klaipeda (Memelland) from Germany.
Article 116 officially annulled the Russian-German agreements at Brest-Litovsk. Article
117 obliged Germany to respect all future treaties that the Allied powers might conclude
with the successor states of the Russian Empire. Also several articles internationalized
the Nemunas (Neiman) River. Although the Lithuanian delegation left the Peace
Conference disappointed that it had failed to win international recognition, it could take
solace in the fact it had used the opportunity to make the world aware of its existence.
Lithuanian Wars of Independence
Specifically, Lithuania wanted to make the world aware of the Polish occupation
of Vilnius, which they viewed as a Lithuanian city. In contrast, Poland objected to
Lithuania's claim to the region, asserted that the majority of inhabitants were Polishspeaking. The two sides both claimed what has subsequently become known as the
Vilnius territory, the region that has traditionally formed the eastern part of Lithuania, of
which the city of Vilnius is only a small part. The Vilnius region contained an ethnically
diverse population. Any data concerning the region from the late nineteenth century was
unreliable and contradictory. For example, the Russian census of 1897 reported the
population of Vilnius and its surrounding territory to have a Belarussian majority (56
63
percent) and a small Polish minority (8 percent.) In 1919, the Poles conducted their own

census of the approximately the same region and recorded the contrary, a dominant
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Polish majority (53 percent) and a small Belarussian minority (7 percent.) Each census

of the Vilnius region during this time period reflected the biases of the census takers. It
has been estimated that approximately 30 percent of the region's population, who were
65
alternatively classified as Poles or Belarussians, lacked a clear national consciousness.

The Lithuanians, basing their claims that the Vilnius region had been populated in ancient
times by Lithuanian tribes also claimed this group. 66 In fact, until both Poland and
Lithuania disputed the ownership of the region in the early twentieth century, no one had
ever questioned that Vilnius had always been the ancient capital of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania. This was the only way Lithuanians had ever viewed Vilnius, as their capital.
To the Lithuanians, not only was territory at stake, but more importantly, the fate of their
capital city. The problem was that over the centuries, the Lithuanian language and culture
had eroded away within the region. Lithuanian censuses could never claim more than 17
percent ofregion's population during the early twentieth century.

67

With Poland and Lithuania unable to reach an agreement concerning rightful
ownership of the Vilnius region, the Lithuanian government asked the Allied Supreme
68
Council to fix a line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian military forces. As

the regional Lithuanian-Polish dispute became an issue of international concern,
Lithuania was at a clear disadvantage for two major reasons. First, Lithuania's
independence had yet to be officially recognized by the Western powers. Sharply
contrasting interpretations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Lithuania's unsettled
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frontiers and a weak central government all served as major obstacles to Lithuania's
recognition. 69 France was actively supporting a large and strong Poland, which it hoped
would serve as the dominant power in Eastern Europe. The first such line was set by the
70
Western powers on June 18, 1919, and was subsequently violated by Polish forces. A

71
second line was drawn, the so-called "Marshal Foch" line, on July 27, 1919. The line

accurately reflected the military situation on the ground, and thus assigned to the
superior, occupying Polish forces large amounts of ethnically Lithuanian territory,
including the Vilnius region. On December 8, 1919 the Supreme Council reassessed the
situation and fixed a provisional eastern boundary of Poland on ethnic grounds,
reassigning the Vilnius and Grodno regions to Lithuania, establishing the so-called
"Curzon line."72 (See Map 7.) The Poles found this move to be unaccept~ble and
proceeded to launch a military campaign against Soviet Russia in April 1920, in the hope
of establishing their sovereignty over the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After
initial Polish success, the Red Army turned the tide and began to repulse the Polish
forces, threatening the very existence of the Polish state. These developments alarmed the
Great Powers, specifically Great Britain, who feared that the German Army might invade
73
Poland to defend German frontiers from the Red Army. In early July, the Great Powers

met at Spa to save Poland.
The Conference in Spa, July 9-10, 1920, recommended to Poland that it must
withdraw behind the Curzon line, and the Red Army must remain 50 kilometers east of

69

Zalys, 71.
The Vilna Question: Consultations ofMM A. De Lapradelle, Louis le Fur, and Andre N.
Mandels tam Concerning the Binding Force of the Decision of the Conference ofAmbassadors ofMarch
15, 1923 (London: Hazell, Watson & Viney, 1929), 12.
71
Ibid., 12-13.
72
Ibid., 13.
73
Zalys, 72.
70

29
that frontier. 74 In tum, the Lithuanians would take control of the Vilnius region.
Furthermore, the Great Powers would settle any future disputes in the region. Polish
Prime Minister Wladyslaw Grabski agreed to negotiate all the proposals, but refused the
transfer of Vilnius to Lithuania. British Prime Minister Lloyd George made it quite clear
that Vilnius was too far from Poland's ethnographic frontier, and that the Great Powers
viewed the Vilnius dispute as a matter for the Lithuanians and the Russians to settle, not
the Poles. 75 The Great Powers presented Poland with an ultimatum: either agree to all
their proposals and the status of Vilnius would be finally settled by the Allied Supreme
Council; or, the issue would be settled between Lithuania and Russia. The Poles
reluctantly agreed, but the ever-changing situation on the ground and the Russian
diplomatic overtures to the Lithuanians would make it a moot point.
Concurrently as the Great Powers and Poland were negotiating at Spa, Soviet
Russia and Lithuania were concluding their own conference in Moscow. Although the
Western powers refused to recognize Lenin's regime, the formal negotiations between the
Lithuanians and Soviet Russia solidified Lithuania's claim to legitimacy, which was
important considering the failure of the Lithuanian delegation to win anything substantial
in Paris. 76 The Lithuanian delegation, headed by Thomas Narusevicius, demanded
recognition of continuity with the old Grand Duchy of Lithuania and asked for formal
recognition of Lithuania by a separate document, not as part of a general peace treaty.
The Soviet delegation headed by Adolf Joffe, however, viewed Lithuania as a new
political unit. The Russians won out and, according to Treaty of Moscow, Russia
unequivocally recognized the independence and sovereignty of Lithuania and renounced
74
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all historical claims to the region. 77 This recognition was based not on any historical
continuity of the Lithuanian state, but on the principle of national self-determination,
which was a much weaker basis ofrecognition.

78

The bulk of negotiating focused upon territorial issues. The Russians agreed to the
Lithuanian demand that ethnic boundaries serve as the basis of Lithuania's frontiers. The
treaty clearly defined the borders between Lithuania and Russia, with Russia recognizing
the sovereignty of Lithuania over the former Russian provinces of Vilnius, Kaunas,
Sulwalki, Grodno, Augustow and Lida, which both sides considered to have an ethnically
Lithuanian population. (See Map 8.) The territory given to Lithuania by Russia, however,
overlapped the "Curzon Line" drawn by Supreme Council on December 2, 1919, and
awarded territory to Lithuania that was under Polish control. In exchange for having most
of its territorial demands satisfied, Lithuania had to agree that the entry of Soviet forces
into Lithuanian territory in the event of Russian conflict with Poland would not be
considered a violation of the treaty or an "unfriendly act" toward Lithuania. The treaty
was contingent on Lithuania remaining neutral in the context of the Russo-Polish war.
The Treaty of Moscow was signed on July 12, 1920.
The following day, July 13, 1920, Poland agreed to transfer control of Vilnius to
the Lithuanians, based upon the Spa agreements. British and French mediators were on
hand in Vilnius to oversee the transfer of the city's control from Poland to Lithuania, as
79
well as to ensure that the Bolsheviks did not take control. The Polish, however, delayed

their withdrawal from Vilnius, which prevented Lithuanian troops from entering the city
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as the Red Army advanced from the east. As a result, the Bolsheviks were the first to
enter Vilnius on July 14, and occupied the city. In spite of the newly signed LithuanianSoviet peace treaty, it appeared that the Soviets had no intention of returning Vilnius to
the Lithuanians.

80

The Soviets then pushed westward and advanced to Warsaw.

At the gates of Warsaw, the tide of the Russo-Polish war turned yet again, and the
Red Army was dealt a crushing defeat. On August 6, 1920, the Soviets signed over
81
Vilnius to the Lithuanians, which the Lithuanian national army occupied on August 26.

The following day, the last Russians withdrew from Lithuanian territory. The Soviets had
been compelled to abandon Vilnius not on the basis of any treaty obligations, but in the
82
course of retreat after the Battle of Warsaw. As the Red Army hastily retreated back

towards the Russia, the Polish forces were in close pursuit and came upon territory
occupied by Lithuanian troops, where some fighting occurred. The Poles complained to
the Allies about the passage of Russian troops through Lithuania, specifically the
transport of Soviet prisoners-of-war, as well as an alleged secret Russian-Lithuanian
military pact. Although the Red Army's passage through Lithuania did little to affect the
military situation, it did weaken Lithuania's international position. British and French
diplomats were immediately sent to investigate Lithuania's declared neutrality. Their
investigation reported no evidence of a Russian-Lithuanian military alliance, but they did
confirm that Soviet prisoners-of-war were being transported across Lithuania. Enraged,
the Poles used this as an excuse to invade Lithuania.
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84
In late August, Lithuanian and Polish military advisors met for talks in Kaunas.

Poland made the same demands that the Soviets made in July, free passage for their
troops in the Vilnius and Grodno regions and control of the Grodno-Lida-Molodechno
railroad. If agreed to, this demand would violate Lithuanian neutrality, which would force
Russia to renounce the Treaty of Moscow. The Lithuanians, as in their talks with the
Soviets, demanded respect for their frontiers. As the talks progressed, Polish forces
pushed deeper into Lithuania and occupied the regions of Augustow, Seiny and Suwalki,
which led to further clashes with Lithuanian troops. Poland viewed Lithuania's resistance
as an alliance with Russia. 85 On this basis, the Polish forces proceeded to attack
Lithuanian forces on a wider front.
When the talks at Kaunas stalled, the Polish foreign minister, Prince Eustachy
Sapieha, telegraphed the League of Nations to complain about the Lithuanian military
86
concessions to Russia and pleaded for international intervention to end the bloodshed.

Similarly, the Lithuanians appealed to Great Britain to help resolve the Polish-Lithuanian
differences. The British advised Lithuania to accept the League's mediation. On
September 16, 1920, the case was formally submitted to the League of Nations in Paris
for arbitration, with Ignance Jan Paderewski presenting the Polish arguments, and
Voldemaras, presenting the Lithuanian perspective. 87 After lengthy discussion, Paul
Hymans of Belgium submitted a resolution that both governments tentatively accepted.
The resolution essentially called for both governments to honor the "Curzon Line" and
that an international commission, appointed by the Council, would oversee that both

84

Grauzinis, 481.
Zalys, 74.
86
Grauzinis, 482.
87
Brockelbank, 485.

85

33
governments abided by it. On October 4, 1920, the international commission composed
of Colonel Chardigny of France, Major Herse of Spain, Major Keenan of Great Britain,
88
Captain Yanamaki of Japan, and Colonel Vegera of Italy arrived in Vilnius. Despite the

tentative agreement reached in

~aris,

fighting intensified along the disputed areas

between Lithuanian and Polish forces.
The Poles and Lithuanians also attempted direct negotiations, meeting at Suwalki
on September 30, 1920. 89 Both sides agreed to cease hostilities and seek peaceful
resolutions to their disputes. Throughout the negotiations, neither side directly mentioned
the city of Vilnius, although it was the main point of the discussions. 90 Both sides agreed,
once again, to accept the Curzon Line, but only as far as the city of Bastunai, about 40
91
miles south of Vilnius, awarding Vilnius to the Lithuanians. The security of the city was

far from guaranteed, however, because the line of demarcation did not extend past
Bastunai, Polish forces could skirt the line without actually violating it. Both sides also
agreed to a mutual exchange of prisoners. The Treaty of Sulwalki was signed on October
7, 1920.
The Zeligowski Coup

On October 5, 1920 Poland and the Soviet Union had reached a provisional
agreement for a cease-fire and the preliminary conditions for peace, which gave Poland a
92
free hand in respect to Lithuania. The Polish National Democratic Party favored openly

attacking Lithuania and occupying as much of its territory as possible, especially Vilnius.
Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski, however, chose a more subtle way of obtaining the same
88
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result; he ordered one of his generals to "mutiny" and seize Vilnius. On the same day the
Sulwalki agreement was signed, the Polish General Lucian Zeligowski attacked
Lithuanian troops at Orany. Two days later on October 9, 1920, the day before the
Sulwalki agreement was to take effect, Zeligowski invaded Vilnius. General Zeligowski's
93
raid was actually anticipated by the British forces in the region. British observers were

initially deceived by the misinformation emanating from Polish sources and believed that
94
this was a "mutinous" action not sanctioned by the Polish government. Zeligowski

triumphantly proclaimed Vilnius and the surrounding territory "The Republic of Central
Lithuania" and furthermore declared himself head of state. Although the Polish
government continually denied their connection with Zeligowski, it kept Zeligowski well
95
supplied with Polish troops and weapons. Not surprisingly, the local Poles in Vilnius,

who had no desire to join Lithuania, welcomed Zeligowski as a national hero. In contrast,
the Jews in Vilnius, who were constantly harassed by Polish forces, fled Vilnius as
refugees to Kaunas. Zeligowski declared his objective to be the "Marshal Foch" line of
demarcation of 1919, but he did not rule out an attack on Kaunas. This prospect was
intended to force the Lithuanian government to accept Zeligowski's demand for
negotiations. 96 Not only did Lithuania lose its capital to a foreign army, but also with
their troops deployed in the Southwest, the heartland of Lithuania was open to further
Polish advance from the east. In desperation, the Lithuanian government expressed a
willingness to negotiate with Zeligowski. Realizing the implications of such an action, it
92
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quickly retracted the offer, not wanting to "legitimize'' Zeligowski's actions. Although
the Allied powers disapproved of Zeligowski's coup de force, they lacked the means and
the will to intervene and restrain Poland and they passed the issue on to the League of
Nations. 97 In an official declaration of October 11 to the Allied Powers, the Polish
government asserted that the territory seized by Zeligowski was now part of Poland.
At the next meeting of the Council in Brussels on October 26, 1920, Lithuania
appealed that Poland's actions violated Articles 12, 13, and 15 of the Treaty of Versailles;
specifically that Poland, as a member of the League of Nations, had "resorted to war in
disregard of its convenants."98 The head of the Polish delegation to the League, declared
that Zeligowski had acted on his own, but that his action had the approval of the entire
Polish nation. 99 On one hand, the League of Nations refused to legitimate Zeligowski's
actions. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the provisional Polish-Soviet peace, the
100
M. Leon
League considered the situation in Eastern Europe to have "changed."

Bourgeois of Prance, who was mediating the discussion, saw no alternative but to declare
that the territorial dispute between Poland and Lithuania over the Vilnius region should
be decided by a plebiscite. The League subsequently ordered an official Plebiscite
Commission to determine what territory was to be included in plebiscite, to prepare the
regulations, and to supervise the administration of the plebiscite. The inability of the
League of Nations to negate the consequences of Zeligowski's actions demonstrated the
101
impotence of the League in resolving international disputes. Although neither Poland

nor Lithuania favored a plebiscite, both formally agreed to one. The largest obstacle to
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overcome during the talks for the plebiscite was the military occupation of the Vilnius
region, where General Zeligowski and his troops were still stationed. 102 How could the
Allies disarm them so as to allow a free expression of opinion? Furthermore, both sides
disagreed on the actual boundaries of the territories to be included in the plebiscite.
As the talks continued in early November, General Zeligowski launched a
surprise offensive with the objective of reaching the line held by Poland at the end of
June 1920, which extended well beyond the city limits of Vilnius to encompass the entire
Vilnius region. Once again, the prospect of a Polish occupation of Kaunas reappeared. By
mid-November the Lithuanian army managed to regroup and halt Zeligowski's advance
at the cities of Sirvintos and Giedraiciai. The Lithuanian national army proceeded to push
Zeligowski's forces back to Vilnius. Although most of their diplomatic efforts to gain
control of Vilnius had failed, the possibility now existed of occupying it militarily.
Despite the opportunity to do so, the Lithuanian government deferred to the League of
Nations Military Commission under French Colonel Chardigny, which ordered all
hostilities to cease immediately. In hindsight, this would be viewed as Lithuania's last
real opportunity to retake Vilnius. 103
The League's Military Commission called for cease-fire talks to be held in
Kaunas. On November 29, 1920, an armistice was signed by the Lithuanian and Polish
governments, which established a neutral zone between the opposing forces. 104 During
the negotiations, Poland refused to recognize Lithuania's borders set by the Treaty of
Moscow, or to have Zeligowski's troops withdraw from Vilnius. These plebiscite
100

Zalys, 76.
Ibid.
Brockelbank, 488.
103
Zalys, 77.

101
102

37
negotiations caused great concern for the Soviets. According to the terms of the proposed
plebiscite, Zeligowski's troops were to be replaced by a League force of over 1,500
troops. Moscow made it clear to the Lithuanians that it would consider such a dispatch of
international forces to the region a threat to Russia's security and a breach of Lithuania's
declared neutrality and, thus, a violation of the Moscow Treaty. Soviet Russia went as far
as to threaten direct intervention. The talks reached a deadlock, as neither side wanted a
plebiscite. Lithuania feared an unfavorable result and Poland saw no need to change the
status quo. On December 31, 1920, the two governments informed the Plebiscite
Commission that they regarded an agreement among themselves as impossible.

105

In light of the many difficulties, the Council asked both Polish and Lithuanian
governments if it could rely on their support in the task of carrying out the plebiscite. In a
letter to the League on Nations on January 21, 1921, Lithuania replied that it would allow
106
First and foremost, they demanded a complete
a plebiscite only on specific terms.

withdraw of Polish troops from the territory in question, including Zeligowski's units.
The plebiscite must be administered by states not directly involved in the dispute.
Lithuania needed a guarantee that another coup de force of General Zeligowski would not
take place. A delay must take place before the plebiscite was administered to allow Polish
propaganda to subside. The League of Nations must grant de jure recognition of
Lithuania, which Poland already had. Finally, Lithuania also stressed the fear of Soviet
interference in the region. In view of this attitude as well as the many difficulties arising
from the presence of General Zeligowski in the region, the League decided to change its
tactics. On March 31, 1921, both nations agreed to negotiate all territorial, economic and
104
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military issues under the arbitration of Paul Hymans, the Belgian Foreign Minister. (See
Map 9.)
Intervention of the Great Powers: The Hymans Plan
As the conference approached, the Great Powers believed the only solution to the
107
Lithuanian-Polish dispute was a federation between the two states. Warsaw welcomed

this arrangement, but for Lithuania, whose sole aim was their own nation-state and who
viewed the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in a negative light, this proposed
federation was unacceptable. The Lithuanians, however, had no alternative to offer. In
Poland, there were three main views on the future of Lithuania. Pilsudski advanced the
idea of reviving the historic "Lithuania" with Vilnius as the capital, but federally linked
to Poland. Alternatively, some favored a separate, but small Lithuania centered on
Kaunas, with Poland annexing the Vilnius region. The most extreme option was the
direct annexation of Lithuania into Poland.
The Conference opened in Brussels on April 20, 1921, with Count Sobanski and
Simon Askenazy heading the Polish delegation and Finance Minister Ernestas
Galvanauskas as head of the Lithuanian delegation. 108 Galvanauskas was authorized to
use all means necessary to reach agreement with Poland, as long as he accomplished
Lithuania's only goal of returning Vilnius and surrounding territory to Lithuania.
Askenazy offered his "federation" proposal and wanted to discuss the overall relations
between Lithuania and Poland, rather than Vilnius in particular. Lithuania was wary
about joining into any federation with Poland, finding it difficult to see how the
arrangement would truly be equal; thirty million Poles would overwhelm the three
106
107

Ibid., 489.
Zalys, 78.

39
million Lithuanians. 109 Nevertheless, Lithuania was willing to discuss the entire spectrum
of options with Poland, as long as Warsaw recognized the independence of Lithuania
with its capital at Vilnius.
After a month of intense discussion, Hymans, who was mediating the Conference,
110
The "first" Hymans plan called for the
submitted a proposal on May 20, 1921.

formation of a Lithuanian Federal State with two equal autonomous cantons of Vilnius
and Kaunas based on the Swiss Model. Lithuania and Poland would share a common
council for foreign affairs, a defensive military convention, an economic convention with
free trade, and Polish commerce would have free use of Lithuanian ports and territory.
Although neither side favored the proposal, both sides agreed to accept it as a basis for
discussion. Lithuania voiced its concerns to the Conference on May 24. Galvanauskas
doubted that the Swiss model could apply to Lithuania. He also argued that Poland would
dominate the various institutions of the proposed federation. He feared Lithuania would
be drawn into Polish conflicts that did not concern Lithuania. Overall, Galvanauskas felt
1
that the Hymans Plan would infringe upon Lithuanian sovereignty.11 The Lithuanians

would neither adopt nor reject the proposal, but use it as a basis of discussion. Poland
also accepted the Hymans Plan as basis for discussion, but demanded that Zeligowski's
statelet of Central Lithuania be included in negotiations. Lithuania strongly objected to
this request, as it would violate the resolution of March 3, 1921, which stipulated that
there would be direct negotiations between Lithuania and Poland without the influence of
108
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third parties. Furthermore, Lithuania did not want to legitimize Zeligowski's actions.
Hymans ultimately rejected the Polish request. Thus, the first Hymans Plan resulted in
stalemate and ultimately failed.
Lithuania and Poland met again at the next Council meeting at Brussels on July
27, 1921, to resume negotiations. As soon as the talks began, it became clear that some
way had to be found to get around the situation caused by Zeligowski and his troops. On
June 28, the Council adopted a resolution that stated any agreement must be approved by
the diets of both Lithuania and Poland, as well as a subsequent diet to be formed in
Vilnius. 112 The resolution also proposed that Zeligowski's troops should be replaced by a
police force under the Military Commission of Control of the League of Nations. The
League would also create a local militia in Vilnius. Finally, the League called for the
partial demobilization of the Lithuanian Army. Although Poland accepted the resolution,
the Lithuanian government felt unable to accept it, finding the provision for ratification
by the Vilnius Diet the chief objection. After yet another failed peace conference, both
sides became frustrated and retreated to their original positions. Lithuania demanded that
Poland observe the Suwalki agreement and restore the status quo before Zeligowski's
military seizure of Vilnius. Poland considered Vilnius as a part of Poland and claimed to
respect the local population's right to self-determination.
Hymans invited the two governments to meet at Geneva on August 25, 1921, to
continue the peace process. On September 3, Hymans submitted his "second" proposal. 113
According to the new proposal, Vilnius would become autonomous rather than a canton,
although the links between Lithuania and Poland as foreseen in the first plan would
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remain. Aware of the outcome of the first proposal, Hymans instructed the sides to give
an opinion on the plan as a whole, not just separate provisions. The Lithuanian delegation
accepted the plan as a basis of discussion, with the intention of editing numerous articles.
Poland rejected the Hyman plan and made it known that it would not accept anything less
than the June 28 resolution, which it had conditionally accepted.

114

Paul Hymans, after having exerted much energy and effort, was forced to
capitulate in the face of historic Lithuanian-Polish enmity. On one side, the Poles were
unwilling to recognize a Lithuanian separate state based on continuity with the historic
115
Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and they tended to look down upon anything Lithuanian.

On the other side, the Lithuanians were stubborn, impatient, and suspicious of their
negotiating partners. 116 At the following Council meeting on September 10, 1921,
Hymans gave a long account of the dispute and asked the League Council to approve his
second plan not as a basis for discussion, but as a draft treaty. The League Council
endorsed Hymans's revised plan and referred the matter to the League Assembly. The
League Assembly heard both Polish and Lithuanian delegations and approved the second
Hymans plan. In an attempt to win Lithuanian support for the second Hymans plan, the
League of Nations admitted Lithuania on September 22, 1921, although the Western
powers had yet to grant it de jure recognition. Despite this small victory, Lithuania had
little faith in the organization. 117 Lithuanian public opinion was clearly against the
negotiations in Brussels and Geneva, as well as the Hymans plan. After reevaluating the
most recent of Hymans's draft proposals, the Lithuanian government sent a letter to the
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League on December 24, 1921, stating it also found it impossible to accept the "second"
Hymans plan. Thus, after many efforts, the Council found its proposals unacceptable to
both governments.
On November 16, 1921, the parliament (Sejm) in Warsaw announced elections in
the Vilnius district for members of an assembly that would decide the fate of the district,
to be held on January 8, 1922. The right to vote was given to all resident adults. The
results were not surprising; the region's Poles participated quite enthusiastically, whereas
the Lithuanians, Jews, and Belarussians either boycotted the polls or participated
minimally. In the city of Vilnius, only 54.8 percent of the registered electorate voted; of
118
Jews eligible to vote, only 1.4 percent participated. Of Lithuanians who according to
119
official statistics made up 7.2 percent of the region's inhabitants, only 7 percent voted.

The Lithuania government did not recognize the legitimacy of the vote nor its results.
The League of Nations Military Commission, which observed the vote, complained about
flagrant irregularities. 120 The election was organized and managed exclusively by Poles,
most voters did not show their cards of identity, and the elections were carried out under
Polish military occupation. They concluded that the Vilnius Sejm (Diet) could not be
considered a "true and sincere expression" of the region's inhabitants. 121
On January 13, 1922, the Council officially ended its efforts to mediate the
dispute, acknowledging its failure and its inability to change the fact of Polish
occupation. Furthermore, it also announced that it would withdraw the Military
Commission of Control within one month. In its decision the League added, "It [the
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League] cannot recognize a solution of a dispute referred to the League of Nations by one
of its members, ifthat solution was made without regard to the proposal of the Council or
without the agreement of both interested parties." 122 On February 17, 1922, the Military
Commission withdrew, and the neutral zone fell into a state of anarchy. The population
was abandoned to its fate, having neither a government nor a regular administration.
Attempting to seize the opportunity, propagandist organizations from both Poland and
Lithuania entered the zone under the guise of "militias." These bands were heavily armed
and desired less to keep the peace than to conquer the zone.

123

The Vilnius Sejm thus elected was composed exclusively of Polish delegates. At
the first session there was only one item on the agenda, the determination of relations
with Poland. On February 20, 1922, the Vilnius Sejm adopted a resolution on formal
124
union with Poland, which passed with a vote of 96-6. The Sejm immediately send a

dispatch to Warsaw proclaiming that the Vilnius district was to be incorporated into
Poland. On March 24, 1922, the Warsaw Sejm ratified the act of union. The Lithuanians
offered various proposals, from continuation of direct talks to adjudication at the
International Court of Justice at the Hague, but Polish-Lithuanian relations were now at a
stalemate. Proclaiming that Vilnius Sejm of Central Lithuania supported unconditional
incorporation into Poland, Warsaw refused any further talks on the question.
During the Council Meeting at Geneva on May 16, 1922, the Council requested
that both governments establish a provisional border and release all political prisoners.
During the meeting, Lithuania made a final plea to the Council to protect the neutral
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zone. 125 Furthermore, the Lithuanian government asked. the Council to draw the attention
of the Great Powers to the urgent necessity of tracing the eastern frontiers of Poland
under the power given to them by Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles. Lithuania
continued to insist upon the supremacy of the Treaty of Suwalki, however Poland refused
to acknowledge that treaty. The League refused, citing the fact that the neutral zone no
126
longer existed, and that the responsibilities were too great for the League to handle.

The League, however, did send in August of 1922 Pedro Saura of Spain and Dr. Stojan
Lasic of the Yugoslavia to observe the situation in Vilnius first hand. In December, Saura
presented his report to the League. 127 It gave a brief history of the violence and anarchy
that had existed in the region since the withdrawal of the Military Commission of Control
in February. He recommended the drawing of a provisional line, which gave practically
the entire Vilnius region to Poland.
Resolution

On February 3, 1923, the Council adopted a resolution laying down a provisional
line of demarcation to be observed by the Lithuanian and Polish governments after
February 15. 128 This line followed the one recommended in the Saura report and awarded
the Grodno-Vilnius-Daugavpils railway to Poland. The cities of Sirvintos and Giedraiciai
were returned to Lithuanian control. Poland immediately accepted this resolution and
proceeded to occupy the portion of the zone assigned to it. Organized Lithuanian
opposition clashed with Polish forces near the cities of Lejpuny and Klepaczi, where
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fighting continued for ten more days.

129

To finalize the incorporation of the Vilnius

region into Poland, Poland asked the Conference of Ambassadors, which was meeting in
Paris, to recognize its eastern borders with Lithuania and the Soviet Union. On March 15,
1923, the Conference of Ambassadors made its momentous decision regulating the whole
130
Vilnius question. The Conference recognized the Russo-Polish frontier as fixed by the

Treaty of Riga of 1921, which was signed by both Poland and Russia, and recognized the
Lithuanian-Polish frontier as fixed on February 3, 1923. This final stroke was a victory
for Poland, who had gained approximately 6,000 square miles.
On April 16, 1923, Lithuania addressed a note to Raymond Poincare, President of
the Conference of Ambassadors, formally refusing to recognize the validity of the
131
Lithuania's objections can be summarized into six major
decision of March 15.

categories. (1) Any right of the Conference of Ambassadors to fix Lithuania's boundaries
came from Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles, which Lithuania did not sign, and thus
the treaty does not apply to Lithuania. (2) The Conference of Ambassadors was aware of
this principle, and had recognized it in regard to Russia because its decision followed the
line specified by the Treaty of Riga. (3) The Conference of Ambassadors referred to
Lithuania's note of November 18, 1922, as being a voluntary submission of the question
to the Conference. This note, however, asked the Great Powers to use the right conferred
on them by Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles to fix the Eastern boundaries of Poland
"taking into account the solemn engagement of that state towards the Lithuanian state and
the vital interests and rights of Lithuania." The Conference of Ambassadors quotes only
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the first part of the note and does not quote the part quoted here. Since the decision did
not take into account the "solemn engagement of Poland towards Lithuania" (the
Sulwalki agreement) the decision was beyond the powers given by the note of November
18, 1922. (4) The right to be exercised by the Great Powers naturally involved the
assumption of an agreement by the states involved, deriving its power from the Treaty of
Versailles. Lithuania, however, did not sign this agreement. (5) Any reliance by the
Conference of Ambassadors on the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations of
January 13, 1922, May 17, 1922, or February 3, 1923, was invalidated by the fact that
Lithuania never accepted them and the Council had no power to impose them without
Lithuania's consent. Thus the Conference was trying to legalize a de facto situation. (6)
There was no representative of Lithuania at the Conference of Ambassadors, and
Lithuania was given no chance to be heard. Although Lithuania refused to recognize the
legitimacy of this decision, Poland and the Great Powers considered the Vilnius dispute
settled. 132
Polish occupation of the Vilnius province (1920-39) did not radically change the
ethnicity of the area. Three demographic changes, however, were noticeable in the
region. 133 (1) Overall decreases in both rural and urban populations due to seven years of
warfare. (2) A decrease in the Jewish population because most of the 1915 evacuees to
Russia did not return. (3) An influx of Polish soldiers, administrators, civil servants, and
their families to fill various administrative and commercial positions created by Polish
imperialism. During the occupation, an intense "Polonization" propaganda campaign was
conducted. As a result, every census from this period conducted by Polish authorities was
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extremely pro-Polish. Over zealous Polish census takers would list all Catholics and all
Polish speakers as Poles. 134 These inflated figures were then relied upon to justify their
claims to the region. In 1921, the Poles claimed that Vilnius County had only 10,738
Lithuanians; contrasted by local Lithuanian leaders who said that Lithuanians numbered
41,050. 135 Unfortunately, no objective data for the differentiation of the population of the
Vilnius region during the interwar period is available.
The Warsaw government did conduct two official republic-wide censuses, on
September 30, 1921 and December 9, 1931. 136 The official figures are in Table 7:
Table 7: Po.12ulation Com.12osition (according to the Polish Censuses of 1921 and 1931)
Polish-Speaking
Poles
Po.12ulation
1931
1931
1921
1931
93,947
Bresiauja 124,036 142,475 70,554
62,513
Dysna
139,569 159,546 59,688
85,299
Asmena
70,021 104,633
?
47,857
99,836
?
Pastovis
83,466
68,424
?
Svencionys 118,819 136,305
Vileika
103,914 130,927
?
59,636
129,660
?
Vilnius
128,954 196,383
180,569
Trakai
159,229 214,070
?
145,732
Lyda
148,073 183,431 123,342
County

Total 1,1076,0811,367,606

873,664

Non-Poles
1921
53,482
79,881

?
?
?
?
?
?
24,731

Non-Polish-Speaking
1931
48,501
97,033
19,334
51,979
67,881
71,291
66,723
33,501
37,699
511,741

Every Polish census found fewer and fewer Lithuanians in the Vilnius region. Even so,
the 1931 census shows that after eleven years of Polish rule, 40.1 percent of the
inhabitants of Vilnius still could not speak Polish. 137 These figures are suspect, since the
Polish census takers were fitting the facts to their predetermined conclusions.
The March 15, 1923, decision of the Conference of Ambassadors not only left
Lithuania and Poland in a state of "no peace, no war," but had the effect of erecting an
134
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impenetrable barrier along the line of demarcation between Lithuania and Poland. No
traffic or mail passed through the border, and communications remained cut off for
fifteen years. Until Nazi Germany's expansionism of the late 1930s, no two European
states exhibited such open mutual hostility. 138 In an attempt to ease this tense situation,
the Conference of Ambassadors urged the two governments to begin direct negotiations
in order to open normal relations. Negotiations began on September 1, 1925, in
Copenhagen and continued from September 15 until October 15 in Lugano, Switzerland,
but they yielded no results.
As the threat of war arose in 1927 and relations became more strained, Lithuania
appealed to the League ofNations. On December 10, 1927, the League Council adopted a
resolution that announced peace between the two countries and proposed that direct talks
should begin with the purpose of achieving good relations, while leaving out of account
questions on which the two states differed. Talks were held in Konigsberg, Warsaw, and
Kaunas. During the discussions, Polish representatives recognized and respected the
sovereignty ofLithuania. 139 The only other result was an agreement, signed on November
7, 1928, concerning the improvement of the condition of farms that were divided or
separated by Poland's acquisition of the Vilnius region. At the insistence of Poland, the
League Council sought the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the
Hague about restoring communications between Lithuania and Poland. Specifically,
Poland was inquiring as to whether the circumstances at the time under international
agreements required Lithuania to open the railroad between Lentvaris and Kaisiadorys.
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On January 24, 1931, the Hague Court responded that current international agreements
did not require Lithuania to do so.
This hostility continued until 1938, when on March 7 a Lithuanian sentry shot and
killed a Polish border-militiaman who was hiding on the Lithuanian side of the border.
Taking advantage of the opportunity, the Polish government delivered an ultimatum to
Lithuania on March 17. Threatening force if Lithuania did not comply, Poland demanded
that Lithuania restore rail and road communications, telephone and telegraph
communications for diplomatic representatives, and it had to send a representative to
Warsaw and accept a representative of Poland in Kaunas. Lithuania complied with the
ultimatum, observing that it was yielding to force, not to what was right. Poland and
140
Lithuania signed a treaty in Augustavas on March 30, 1938. The question of Vilnius

arose at the international level again after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed on
August 23, 1939. In the secret protocol attached to this agreement, Germany and the
141
Soviet Union recognized the rights and interests of Lithuania in the Vilnius region.

After Poland collapsed and the Soviets occupied Vilnius in the fall of 1939, the city was
142
handed over to Lithuania on October 10 in accordance with a treaty made in Moscow.

By this treaty Lithuania had to give up extensive territory for the benefit of the Soviet
Union, although under the Moscow Treaty of 1920, that territory belonged to Lithuania.
The Vilnius question was but one of the many territorial conflicts that plagued
Eastern Europe between the World Wars. Parallels to the dispute can also be found more
recently in Israeli-Arab or Indian-Pakistan relations. What makes the Lithuanian-Polish
Ibid.
"Secret Protocol to the Russo-German Nonagression Pact of August 23, 1939," in The USSRGerman Aggression Against Lithuania, 111.
142
"Treaty on the Transfer of Vilnius and Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance," in Ibid., 149-50.
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dispute so unique is that the Lithuanians insisted that the contested region included their
capital. The heart of the problem lay in the ideology of Lithuanian nationalism.
Lithuanian nationalism had to justify itself, and its proponents based their case for
political independence on the glories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which had its
capital in Vilnius. To renounce Vilnius was the equivalent of renouncing independence
itself. Even after gaining their long-sought-after independence, most Lithuanian leaders
still could not free themselves of this mindset.
Vilnius, however, was a diverse city that contained numerous nationalities. The
Vilnius province was a cultural frontier where linguistic and cultural boundaries mingled
and blurred. Nationalism, both political and cultural, among the inhabitants, appeared
only during the last years of the nineteenth century. Vilnius was a problematic nightmare
to the ethnologist, diplomat, and historian alike, as it defied any delineation of nationalethnic boundaries. Demographic data, mainly because of the national bias of various
census takers, have only added to the ethnological confusion, as scholars were confronted
with contradictory statistical data.
The Lithuanian nationalists insisted on the formation of their own national state,
and in a multi-national region, this inevitably had to bring conflict. Even though
Lithuanians had enjoyed considerable sympathy among Vilnius's Jews, the Lithuanians
failed to win the loyalty of the city's entire population, or even a majority. They could
offer no defense of the city against Zeligowski' s coup de force in October 1920. Unable
to regain Vilnius by themselves, Lithuania's leaders considered all international problems
in the context of the Vilnius question, and this attitude persisted into the first year of
World War II. Despite Lithuania's lip service to the League of Nations; its foreign policy

51
was based entirely on anti-Polish feelings. In the long run, however, the resolution of the
Vilnius question was in hands of neither the Poles nor the Lithuanians, but in the hands of
the Great Powers.
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